Armstrong v. Charlotte County School District
- 27 IDELR 1035
- Florida
- (M.D., Fla. 1998)
- B.A. by and through his parents
- Michael ARMSTRONG and
- Linda ARMSTRONG
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Plaintiffs |
v. |
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- SCHOOL BOARD FOR CHARLOTTE COUNTY,
- Florida
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Defendant |
No. 98-38-CIV-FTM-25A
U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division
March 20, 1998
- Summary
- A School district and the parents of an 11-year-old gifted student with a
hearing impairment went to due process over the qualifications of the student's sign
language interpreter. The parents claimed the district denied the student a FAPE when it
failed to provide an interpreter who signed entirely in Signed Exact English or Signed
English. An Administrative Law Judge agreed with the parents, and ordered the district to
hire an interpreter who signed only in English. Additionally, the ALJ recommended the
district hire a certified interpreter. The Defendants appealed the ALJ's decision. When
the district failed to hire a new interpreter, the parents sought an injunction compelling
the district to comply with the ALJ's order.
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- Held: for the parents.
- First, the court rejected the district's assertion that injunctive relief was
not available under the IDEA. Since the parent's claim was brought under Section 1983, and
injunctive relief is permitted under Section 1983, the court determined injunctive relief
could be awarded. Next, the court concluded the stay-put provision did not operate to
allow the district to refrain from hiring a new interpreter until the appeals process was
finished. The stay-put provision cannot be used against parents who prevailed at the
administrative level. The district was not entitled to use the stay-put provision as
justification for its failure to hire a new interpreter. Turning to the merits of the
requested injunction, the court evaluated the four factors and determined they weighed in
favor of granting the injunction. The student was suffering an irreversible injury by
being assigned an interpreter he was unable to communicate with, and the parents were
likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The burden on the district to hire an
interpreter capable of signing in English was not greater than the harm that would result
to the student, and the district failed to demonstrate the issuance of the injunction
would frustrate any public interest.
Based on these findings, the court granted the requested injunction.
- Counsel for Parents: Laura L. Whiteside, Esq., Tampa, Florida
- Counsel for District: Usher L. Brown, Esq., Orlando, Florida
- HENRY LEE ADAMS, Jr., United States District Judge
-
- Order
- Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkts. 2,3),
and Defendant's Memorandum in opposition (Dkts 19, 21). The Court heard oral argument on
February 27, 1998. Having reviewed said motion and response, the argument of counsel, and
otherwise being fully advised, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
-
- 1. Facts1
- B.A. is an eleven year old hearing-impaired child. He is enrolled at Port
Charlotte Middle School in a gifted sixth grade program. B.A.'s parents, Michael and Linda
Armstrong, have kept him from attending school since approximately January 5, 1998, based
on the fact that B.A.'s classroom sign language interpreter provided by Charlotte County
School Board ("School Board") does not sign entirely in his primary language,
Signed Exact English, or its derivative, Signed English. Because of the language
discrepancy, B.A. apparently has some difficulty understanding what transpires in the
classroom. The Armstrongs brought an Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
("IDEA") action before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the
Florida Division of Administrative Hearings to determine: "Whether the Charlotte
County School Board is providing [B.A.], a gifted, hearing-impaired 6th grader, with a
free appropriate public education?"
The ALJ in his Final Order, dated December 30, 1997, ordered the School Board
to "provide [B.A.] with another educational interpreter who is capable of
interpreting and signing solely in English." (Dkt. 1, Exh. A at 30). The ALJ added
that "[w]hile it may prove difficult, in selecting another interpreter, the School
Board should make the effort to obtain an interpreter who is certified at the EIE-3
level." id. On January 20, 1998, the Armstrongs filed this action to enforce
the part of the ALJ's decision requiring the School Board to obtain another interpreter
for B.A. Shortly thereafter the School Board filed an action challenging the ALJ's
decision. (See 98-26-CIV-FTM-25D) As of this Court's February 27, 1998, hearing, the
School Board has not obtained a new interpreter for B.A., nor have B.A.'s parents returned
him to school
- ANALYSIS
- A. Standard on Preliminary Injunction
- To prevail on a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff mush show: (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) potential harm to the
opposing party if the order is issued; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved
by the grant of a preliminary injunction. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v Donovan, 689
G.2d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 1982); Local Rule 4.05(b)(4).
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- B. Individuals with Disabilities Act and Section 1983
- 1. Availability of Injunctive Relief
- The School Board has made several arguments regarding the validity of the ALJ's
order and whether that order may be enforced by injunction; however, the School Board has
not discussed whether a prevailing party may receive an injunction to enforce a hearing
officer's decision.2 See 20 U.S.C. 1415(1)(2)(A) ("Any
party aggrieved by the findings and decision...shall have the right to bring a
civil action...") (emphasis added). Several courts have held that the IDEA does not
permit the prevailing party to enforce a favorable decision by injunction, however, a
prevailing party may obtain injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Jeromy H. v.
Mt. Lebanon School District, 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3rd cir 1996); Robinson v.
Pinderhughus, 810 F.2d, 1270, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1987). Because B.A. has also brought
this action pursuant to Section 1983, the Court finds that an injunction is an available
remedy in this case.
-
- 2. Stay-Put Provision
- The School Board argued at the hearing that pursuant to the stay-put provision
contained in the IDEA, the School Board should not be required to provide a new
interpreter for B.A. until the resolution of this case and the School Board's appeal in
98-26-CIV-FTM-251). The IDEA's "stay-put provision," 20 USC 1415(j) provides
that:
- ...during the pendency of any proceedings pursuant to this section, unless the
State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, this child
shall remain in the then-current placement of such a child...
Courts have held that this provision does not operate against parents who have
prevailed in administrative proceedings for at least two reasons. Courts have rationalized
that the state administrative hearing in favor of the parents and the child constitutes an
"agreement" between a state agency and the parents within the meaning of
1415(j). See J. B. v Killingly, 1997 WL784807, *8-9 (D. Conn 1997); Susquenita
Sch. Dist v. Raelee S., 96F 3d 78, 84 (3d Cir 1996). Additionally, because the IDEA
was enacted for the benefit of disabled children, the stay-put provision cannot be enforced
against prevailing parents and their children. id. Because the Armstrongs
prevailed before the Florida ALJ the Court finds the stay-put provision does not prevent
the granting of an injunction in this instance.
- 3. Preliminary Injunction Factors
- a. Irreparable Injury
- B.A. claims that "the difficulties with his interpreter, along with the
significant breech of confidentiality and the hostility that arose as a result of the
proceedings has proved to be too hard." and that he is "losing valuable
educational opportunity and suffering emotionally." (Dkt. 3 at 21-22) It is unclear
from the first and second affidavits of Linda Armstrong who allegedly breached B.A.'s
confidentiality and what specifically was revealed. Further, the School Board emphasizes
the fact that the Armstrongs are keeping B.A. out of school and causing him to suffer
injury. The ALJ found that B.A. was entitled to an SE Interpreter, based on the decision
that B.A.'s current interpreter's mode of communication is inadequate for B.A. Thus to the
extent that B.A.'s time in school involves an interpreter that does not sign in his
primary language, he would suffer the same injury were he to remain in school. The Court
finds that B.A. has shown irreparable injury to justify an injunction.
-
- b. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
- The parties differ in how they characterize what constitutes "the
merits" of this action. Defendants argue that this case concerns strictly whether
B.A. is receiving "some educational benefits" and not whether the School board
has complied with the Charlotte County Special Programs and Procedures Manual
("SP&P"), a funding document. See Hendry Hudson District Board of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982). The Armstrongs, on the other hand,
contend that whether B.A. is receiving a free, appropriate public education also includes
whether the School Board has complied with its SP&P manual, approved by the Florida
Department of Education.
To determine whether B.A. is receiving a free, appropriate public education,
this Court must determine: (1) whether the State has complied with the procedures set
forth in the IDEA; and (2) whether the IEP developed through the Act's procedures is
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits, Rowley,
458 U.S. at 206-207. The IDEA defines "free, appropriate public education" as
special education and services that: (A) have been provided at public expense, under
public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the
State Education Agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or
secondary school education in the state involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with
the individualized education program...20 U.S.C. 1401(8) (emphasis added).
B.A.'s IEP required an "educational interpreter." (Affidavits of
Linda Armstrong, Exh. 1). The ALJ found that the educational interpreter provided for B.A.
was inadequate. The School Board argues that the ALJ's decision, based in part of the
SP&P document which discusses the development of "optimum" skills for
hearing-impaired students, disregarded Rowley which states that an IEP need only
be calculated to provide some educational benefit. Although the ALJ made clear in his
findings that B.A. was receiving some educational benefits, he found that the School Board
has not complied with the SP&P documents. The ALJ did not disregard the rule of Rowley,
however, he merely applied the first prong of the Rowley test to determine that
the IEP as implemented did not comport with the standards of the Florida Department of
Education as stated in the SP&P documents. The School Board provides no authority to
support its position that the SP&p documents cannot be used to determine what
constitute "the standards of the State education agency." Therefore the ALJ's
application of Rowley to the facts of this case does not "supplant" the
IDEA nor the jurisdiction of this Court. The Court finds that B.A. has shown a likelihood
of success on the merits of his IDEA claim.
- c. Burden on Defendant
- The School Board suggests that it will be difficult to find someone "of the
qualifications which might be acceptable to the [Armstrongs]." and object on the
grounds that the ALJ's order constitutes an interference in the School Board's personnel
decision-making (Dkt 19). As the Court reads the ALJ's order, he required the School Board
to provide B.A. with "an interpreter who is capable of interpreting and signing
solely in English." This appears to be a straightforward directive. The ALJ further
suggests that the School Board "should make the effort to obtain an interpreter who
is qualified at the EIE-3 level." As the language suggests, this is not a directive,
but a suggestion. Thus it would appear that, to comply with the order, the School Board
needs to identify and employ an SE or SE/SEE interpreter. The ALJ did not require the
School Board to hire an EIE-3 certified interpreter. It does not appear that the burden on
the School Board in obtaining an English interpreter outweighs the harm to B.A. if an
injunction were not issued until the merits of this case have ultimately been decided.
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- d. Public Interest
- The School Board has not identified a public interest that would be frustrated
by the granting of a preliminary injunction on this case.
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- C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act
- Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's are entitled to a preliminary
injunction under Section 1983 on their IDEA claim, the Court need not consider Plaintiff's
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims at this juncture.
-
- III. CONCLUSION
- Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkts. 2) is GRANTED;
2. Defendant, Charlotte County School Board, is ordered to provide B.A. with an
educational interpreter consistent with the ALJ's Final Order directing the same;
3. This Order shall remain in full force and effect until modified by an order
resolving the merits of this case, or upon the determination of this case by trial, or by
other appropriate order;
4. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Amended Motion to dismiss (Dkts. 19, 21)
are DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida of this (20th) day of March, 1998
- HENRY LEE ADAMS, JR.
- UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
1The relevant facts are detailed in the Administrative
Law Judge's Final Order (Dkt. 1, Exh. A, "Preliminary Statement") and are
incorporated herein by reference.
2Defendants have argued that B.A. is not the prevailing
party, and therefore is not entitled to attorneys fees. The Court finds that the ALJ
ordered the School Board to provide the relief B.A. requested, and therefore B.A. is a
prevailing party under IDEA.
27 IDELR 1035
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